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CAPACITY TO BEAR LOSS AS A FACTOR IN THE
DECISION OF CERTAIN TYPES OF TORT CASES
L. W. FEEZER
INTRODUCTION
Is the ability-the economic capacity-to sustain the loss
one of the major factors in the decision of cases? This question
might be asked with reference to litigation in various types of
factual situations, without suggesting that it is the ,only basis
upon which cases are decided. It is proposed in this paper to
examine a number of decisions, representing certain types of cases
frequently arising in the field of torts, in which damages have
been recovered notwithstanding theories or doctrines which in
many instances of the same sort have been referred to by the
courts as reasons for denying recovery. If the plaintiffs are being
permitted to recover in tort cases, and such recovery is allowed
or approved by appellate courts, notwithstanding the doctrines
which are invoked to the contrary, why is this so? What factors
enter into the process of judgment with sufficient power to defeat
the application of the traditional rules of law? If the law is
against the plaintiff, how and why does he have judgment?
During a part of the Nineteenth Century, and until relatively
recent years, there was much legal writing as to the nature of
law, which indulged in speculation as to whether judges, in the
process of deciding cases, make law or declare law. This inquiry,
(8o5)
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by contrast with much of the writing of today, might not un-
reasonably be compared to the conundrum as to which came first,
the hen or the egg. But the question will not down as to why
the judges do decide one way rather than the other in a particular
case. Indeed, is not this question kept ever open by the activities
of the courts themselves? Can one browsing through the deci-
sions upon a particular topic over a considerable period escape
the observation that frequently a case is decided in a certain way,
whereas other cases-so similar as to be referred to as "on all
fours" with it-have been decided the other way? Are there many
situations as to which the rule is so well settled that no contra-
dictory decisions can be found? Does the fact that "the rule
appears to be well settled" on a particular point today offer any
assurance that it will remain so?
A case arises for judgment, and no precedent is brought to
the attention of the court, of sufficiently direct application to the
precise fact situation to be considered controlling. The court
delivers an opinion giving a rationalization of that decision. Does
that opinion express and weigh and evaluate all the factors which
enter into it? To do so would be impossible. All the factors
which operate upon the conscious mind of the judge might con-
ceivably be referred to, but they usually are not. Even so, is it
not indeed impossible to determine from the opinion what other
factors may have subconsciously influenced the decision? The
factors present in the minds of judges making decisions are not
constant. Professor Green has suggested a classification of them
as applied to the determination of duty in negligence cases-a
classification including types of factors which are presumably
among the most constant. He names them as follows: (i) The
administrative factor, (2) the ethical or moral factor, (3) the
economic factor, (4) the prophylactic factor, and (5) the justice
factor.'
'Green, The Duty Problem in Negligence Cases (1928) 28 COL. L. REV.
1014, (1929) 29 COL. L. REv. 255. See also GREIx, THE RATIOxALE OF 1>ROXI-
MATE CAUSE (1927) 3. See also, in general, ibid. c. 4.
In the COLUMBrA LAW RELEW article, supra, Mr. Green has indicated the
duty problem as being the fundamental determination which the judge must make
in a negligence case. As he puts it, the court must determine whether the state
affords its protection to the plaintiff's interest here involved, as against the hazard
which has, in the instant case, so violated that interest as to cause damage.
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There are many contributing factors in the process of judg-
ing that cannot be named, but certain ones which appear fre-
quently may be noted as suggesting classifications. It is sub-
mitted, however, that capacity to bear loss is one factor in de-
termining the existence of a duty on the part of the defendant in
at least some negligence cases, and an endeavor will be made to
show that this is so.2  Very rarely is this expressly referred to,
and only occasionally by inference, but it is believed that it never-
theless speaks with a still small voice in the results which have
been reached in a number of cases.
The factors which enter into passing judgment do not all
tend toward the same end; they represent divergent, even con-
flicting, interests. There has been frequent reference in the last
few years to the "balancing of interests". In every case there
are the interests of the parties, which are at least in some respects
in conflict, and there is the social interest. Judging involves a
reconcilement of these interests. Indeed, what is law but a scheme
of social control which aims by its judgments to reconcile inter-
ests? Hence the function of judging is not performed solely
with reference to the particular facts and parties. The decision
of a case involves the more complex process of considering the
factors which will dispose of the particular case as satisfactorily
as possible, without violating the sanctions by which society con-
trols its members-not only formal legal sanctions as administered
in the courts, but custom, etc. The societal sanctions tend to
indicate, though not always clearly, what interests are to be pro-
tected, and a standardization of legal duty then comes into exist-
ence. The process is simply this: as repeated fact situations
arise, the court aids itself in weighing and applying the factors
which must enter into its decision by reference to past decisions.
So, in time, duty becomes standardized as to that situation. When
other fact situations somewhat less similar arise, the court, faced
with a conflicting consideration, again refers back and ration-
alizes another opinion by analogy. Thus generalizations develop.
It seems to the author that this tendency toward standardization
2 PoUND, THE SPIRIT OF THE CommoN LANw (1921) i89. "There is a
strong and growing tendency, where there is no blame on either side, to ask in
view of the exigencies of social justice, who can best bear the loss."
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of duty is society's effort at a natural selection of those interests
which it desires to protect. As yet it has great imperfections.
This process of growth or development of standards of duty by
analogy has a great weakness. As one stone is fitted to another,
it may fit snugly against its immediate neighbor and yet the whole
may constitute anything but a symmetrical pattern.
Another weakness of this selective effort at standardization
is that it proceeds by analogy and induction toward something
static, in a social environment which is not static. A rule of law
expressing a duty in particular cases is built up by syllogism, upon
premises founded in social sanctions, and before it is complete
its premise is carried away by the ebb or flow of social philosophy,
which creates and protects one interest only to discard and con-
demn it at a later period.
But what has all this to do with the suggestion that capacity
to bear the loss is a factor in the decision of certain types of tort
actions? Perhaps this, that "capacity to bear the loss" is just
another phrase-another word-symbol. Justice, society's con-
science, or whatever it is, conforms like the shape of the jelly
fish or the color of a chameleon to the stimuli which reach it.3
The "humanitarian" social conscience of today is apparently much
more concerned with the poor devil who gets injured by our
modern devices than was the social conscience of the Victorian
period.4  So it is that the social concept of what is the end or
purpose of law seems to be changing, and a new concept finds
its place in the law, as the courts determine new duties calculated
3 What has happened in the last two or three decades in the master and
servant cases is an excellent demonstration of this. See Mr. Green's discussion
cf this, (1929) 29 CoL L. REv. 255-263.
' The mechanization of life has created dangers unknown and unanticipated
in the period when the rules or formulas of the law were being cast into the
forms in which they have come down to us, and when the courts were stating
the generalities about duty, which have subsequently been referred to as "prin-
ciples" and which later courts have employed deductively in the decision of
similar cases. However, the impinging of the social consciousness upon the
judge as a man has and does modify his conservatism and his traditional ad-
herence to stare dec4siy. The changing point of view has come not only because
of new hazards in life, but because there are new economic and political con-
cepts. It is in part a reaction to representative government, to more widespread
education, and to general prosperity. We have the greatest prosperity for the
whole mass of the people ever known in history. There is a general sense of
well-being and an expansiveness of spirit that wants to share the general pros-
perity with the other fellow, rather than leave him unaided after an accident.
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to protect interests not previously recognized as protected by ex-
isting rules of law. That is to say, from time to time judgments
are given in favor of plaintiffs who have suffered harm through
the operations and activities of other persons or groups, and who
are enabled in this way to shift the burden of the loss incurred.5
Since cases indubitably are being decided from time to time
with results contrary to earlier cases where the objective situation
is equivalent, and, since social duty concepts are so changing as
to bring this about, is it fair to suppose that such a factor as
capacity to bear the loss may be contributory to the formulation
of new rules of legal duty?
It is now proposed to go more particularly into some specific
cases in an effort to discover some of the factors which have en-
tered into the decision of tort cases and to determine whether
there may be discerned in the opinions any indication that some
account was taken of capacity to bear the loss involved.6 If there
is any guiding principle as to who can best bear loss, it would
seem to be that it is the party who can absorb it with the least
injury to himself and in such a way as will produce a minimum
of consequential problems of social adjustment for himself or
his dependents. References to this may be noted in many cases
and will be pointed out in connection with the cases later dis-
cussed.7 The defendant upon whom is placed the burden of a
money loss in a tort action may distribute the loss by insurance
or by adding it to the cost of carrying on his business; in either
'Feezer, Social Justice in the Law of Torts (1926) ii MINN. L. REv. 313-
317.
, This study must necessarily refer to instances in which the judge has ap-
parently taken into account the capacity to bear loss. Few would doubt that the
jury is frequently influenced by this consideration. The trial judge has expressed
his reaction to this as well as to the other factors which make up his concept of
the duty involved in the case, when he determines whether or not the issue
shall go to the jury, when he rules on motions in the trial, when he instructs
the jury, and when he rules on motions for judgment, new trial, etc. The ap-
pellate court is confronted with the same problem of judging when the case
reaches it on review.
"Douglas, Vcariousr Liabiity and Administration of Risk (1928) 38 YALE
L. J. 584-72o; Marx, Compulsory Autonwbile lnsurance (1925) ii A. B. A. J.
731; Marx, Compulsory Compensatim Innrance (1925) 59 Am. L. REv. 200,
(1925) 25 Co. L. REv. 164; Marx, Compulsory Automobile Insurance (1927)
I CINN. L. REv. 445; Marx, The Curse of the Personal Injury Suit and a Rem-
edy (i924) io A. B. A. J. 493.
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case it is distributed ultimately upon society. In so far as society
approves this distribution of loss, it would seem that it is admitting
its ultimate responsibility for injuries which arise out of a civiliza-
tion of increasing social interdependence. 8
As has already been stated, one does not find in the reported
decisions very frequent reference to the distribution of risk or
capacity to bear loss as a basis for the result reached. Occasion-
ally it may be rather clearly inferred from statements in an opin-
ion, but usually it must be read from the result itself, by compar-
ing that result with the conclusions expressed in other cases
involving objectively equivalent fact situations. The courts have
rationalized their decisions in most of these cases by resort to
various of the accepted theories, doctrines, and formulas. With-
out abandoning what Professor Green calls "the theology of
negligence",' they have found it possible to place responsibility
on defendants for harms unimagined by the judges who first
formulated these doctrines, although the doctrines invoked were
the rationalization of decisions which denied recovery and left
the loss with the plaintiff who had sustained it.1°
'In many ways society assumes responsibility for the mistakes, accidents,
and misfortunes which have come to be ascribed to imperfect social adjustment.
This appears as "welfare legislation", and publicly supported institutions for
various types of handicapped or "under opportunitied' persons, especially chil-
dren. These are supplemented by privately supported institutions and societies
for relief, prevention, and propaganda; by state and city departments of pre-
ventive medicine, crime prevention and fire prevention departments, and there is
widespread support of, and participation in various "drives", "campaigns", and
other schemes in aid of the social work organizations.
'Green, The Duty Problem in Negligence Cases, mtpra note I.
" Is not social evolution in various lines of thought accomplished by proc-
esses of this sort? It may be observed that in recent years various religious
denominations, with orthodox creeds and articles of faith which are still formally
subscribed to, have found room within their folds for men and women whose
personal beliefs would have made them anathema to both church and state when
those creeds were formulated.
No better illustration of this curious mental process could be found than
the one Dean Pound has borrowed from Mnixc TWAIN's Tom SAWYER. In THE
SPIRIT OF THE Co moN LAW, SupraI note 2, at I66, Dean Pound tells us how
Tom Sawyer insisted on digging Jim's way to freedom with a case knife; but,
when he was sufficiently discouraged with this process, he was willing to use a
pick axe as long as it was called a case knife. Then, by way of comment, he
gives us this brilliant paragraph:
"Tom Sawyer had made over again one of the earliest discoveries of the
law. When legal tradition prescribed case knives for tasks for which pick axes
were better adapted, it seemed better to our forefathers, after a little vain effort
with case knives, to adhere to principle but use a pick axe. They granted that
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MANUVACTURER-DEALER-CONSUIER
That the courts are imposing a stricter standard of duty upon
manufacturers and dealers in case of injury to consumers of their
products, may be readily observed. The writer has endeavored
in a previous article :" to show that this development has brought
a new duty standard within the traditional negligence formula
of "due care under the circumstances", and, at the same time,
demonstrates the tendency of the courts to distribute the loss
when harm results to consumers or users of defective products.
This is accomplished when the injured consumer recovers money
compensation from the manufacturer or dealer, who in turn must
adjust his business to absorb this charge.' 2  It would appear that,
by decisions in cases of this type in recent years, the courts are
establishing new standards of social responsibility for manufac-
turing in much the same way as was done with common carriers
some years earlier.' 3 Among tort cases of this type, McPherson
v. Buick Motor Co.14 is familiar as one of the decisions indicating
judicial recognition of a newer social consciousness as to the duties
of manufacturers.
The decisions in McPherson v. Buick Motor Co. and other
cases involving manufacturers have, of course, been readily ration-
the law ought not to change. Changes in law were full of danger. But on the
other hand it was highly inconvenient to use case knives. And so the law has
always managed to get a pick axe in its hands, though steadfastly demanding a
case knife, and to wield it in the virtuous belief that it was using the approved
instrument."
'Feezer, Tort Liability of Mamfacturers ad Vendors (1925) IO MINN.
L. REv. I.
"Ibid.; see also (1924) 2 WIS. L. Rv. 431; note (1926) 40 HARv. L. REv.
886. As to the limits of industry's capacity to absorb and distribute these various
losses, see Douglas, op. cit. supra note 7, 720 et seq.
' The devices used in accomplishing these results are similar in both types
of cases and include: Rules as to burden of proof, special standards of care or
degrees of negligence (viz., highest care, gross negligence, etc.), implied war-
ranty, duty of inspection, duty to know of certain defects, various definitions of
proximate cause.
'217 N. Y. 382, 1i N. E. 1050 (1916). The automobile manufacturer was
held liable to the purchaser from a retail dealer who was injured by the collapse
of a wheel having defective spokes. Judge Cardozo said that an automobile was
such a thing that it was reasonably certain to place life and limb in danger, if
negligently made, and that in such cases there is a duty of inspection upon the
manufacturer, even though the wheels were supplied by an independent maker
who sold them to the defendant. See my more complete discussion of this case
suprc note ii; Terry, Negligence (1915) 29 HAv. L. REv. 40.
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alized in terms of the established formulas of the law of negli-
gence, but they do, nevertheless, define duties not regularly
recognized a few years earlier. This is typical of the somewhat
epoch-making decisions which attract marked attention as being
the first, or at least the first well-expressed, judgments in which
certain fact situations are judicially recognized in explicit lan-
guage, as involving conduct " on the defendant's part which has
come to be so clearly regarded as anti-social by contemporary
standards as to demand legal responsibility for its consequences. 16
It is also noteworthy that a great many of the modern tort deci-
sions of this sort involve fact situations totally unknown to judges,
juries, or anyone else a generation or more ago; and it is only
as the relation of these things to society becomes apparent through
experience, that the correct "social engineering" will be worked
out for handling the "stresses and strains" upon the legal struc-
ture which their incorporation therein involves. Thus, we find
in the books today a large and increasing number of decisions
which show judicial recognition of the social necessity of im-
posing a very exacting degree of responsibility upon the manu-
facturers of machinery for the proper functioning thereof, be-
cause of the many and disastrous harms which may result from
an improper functioning.
Before the days of mechanical locomotion, the number of
injuries to persons travelling on highways was negligible as com-
pared with present conditions. The occasional injury of a
pedestrian run over by a vehicle, or of a passenger thrown from
a poorly-built carriage, was not frequent enough to constitute a
'5In view of the controversy as to whether negligence is objective or sub-
jective the word "conduct" is perhaps not broad enough. It is not intended to
confine its meaning to that which is objective, nor on the other hand to affirm
that negligence may include subjective elements. See Edgerton, Negligence, In-
advertence and Indifference; the Relation of Mental States to Negligence (925)
39 HARV. L. REv. 849. Seavey, Negligence-Subjective or Objective? (1927) 41
HARV. L. Rv. I; Terry, Negligence, op. cit. supra note 14, at 40.
" Proximate cause as a legal theory is not a part of the present inquiry
Before the defendant will be held responsible there must of course be a causal
connection. in fact, and the court, by its decision in favor of the plaintiff, or by
determining that the case should go to the jury, must have held that there is a
legal duty sufficient to constitute legal cause in the particular case. See Gaaax,
ThE RATION1ALE OF PROXImATE CAUSE, supra note i; Bingham, Some Sug-
gestions Concerning "Legal Cause" at Common Law (igo9) 9 Cor. L. REv. i6;
Book Review (i927) 41 HARV. L. REv. 939; also Green, Are There Dependable
Rules of Proximate Cause? (1928) 77 U. OF PA. L. REv. 6oi.
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social phenomenon. The fact that injured persons must bear
losses did not loom large enough in the public opinion to be a
social problem.
17
The extent to which the person who is responsible for the
operation of a machine may be liable to him who is hurt by the
machine is still uncertain. Evidences of a tendency to shift and
distribute the loss are appearing from time to time in diverse
forms. This tendency may take the form of a greater develop-
ment of liability without fault. The courts may find it just as
easy to place a legal responsibility upon the man who brings a
dangerous force upon the highway, in the form of an automobile
weighing thousands of pounds and capable of going eighty miles
per hour, to keep it under control at his peril, as to fix this degree
of responsibility upon the man who brings upon his land a sub-
stance which, if it escapes from his control, turns into a dangerous
force."8 Or this tendency may produce legislation requiring
every car operated on the public highway to be covered by lia-
bility insurance. 19 This has already been judicially declared a
proper exercise of the police power.
20
That this whole approach to the problem is quite the an-
tithesis of the individualism which characterized the law in the
Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries, will be very generally
realized, particularly if the policy of distributing loss is reduced
'The development of legal rules as to responsibility in tort for defective
vehicles has accompanied the evolution of machine transportation. It may be
traced in outline through three cases: Winterbottom v. Wright, io M. & W.
iog (Eng. I842), which is the foundation of the doctrine that a coach manufac-
turer is not liable to a user of his product injured by a defect therein, in the
absence of privity of contract; Huset v. Case Threshing Machine Co., 120 Fed.
865 (C. C. A. 8th, i9o3), in which is traced the gradual attenuation of the rule
through its exceptions; and finally McPherson v. Buick Motor Co., supra note
14, where it is abandoned in favor of a direct application of a duty theory
worked out in terms of negligence, completes the story.
"Fletcher v. Rylands, L. R. 3 H. L. 330 (Eng. 1868) ; and see Bohen, The
Ride in Rylands v. Fletcher (i91o) 59 U. OF PA. L. R~v. 298, 373, 423.
" See articles by Marx, supra note 7.
' Opinion of the Justices, 251 Mass. 569, 147 N. E. 68I (1925) ; Opinion of
the Justices, 81 N. H. 566, 129 Atl. 117 (1925). These statutes were not in-
tended to increase or change the basis of legal responsibility of automobile own-
ers, but only to secure against financial irresponsibility, see Note (925) 35 YALz
L. J. io.
W. 0. Douglas, in his article, supra note 7, at 59i, discussing various appli-
tions of liability insurance as a risk-shifting device, says of it: "It has such flex-
ibility that it can be used whenever a court decrees liability."
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to such terms as compulsory insurance, providing compensation
to all persons injured by automobiles, irrespective of fault. It
will follow from this that the many careful drivers will bear an
equal burden with the careless ones who actually cause injury.
This would indeed be a socialized, as contrasted with individual-
ized, justice. Changes such as this come about only when they
are recognized as social necessities. The fundamental problem
is not one of law, but of social adjustment, with law used as one
of the means for its accomplishment.
After all, as already implied in this article, certain factors,
not in terms referred to as propositions of law, are nevertheless
considered by courts in deciding cases. Consciously or uncon-
sciously, social policy and contemporary ethical and political
philosophy are factors which play some part in the decisions of
cases in the courts. This has not only been referred to by com-
mentators on jurisprudential questions, but is also recognized in
those decisions which refer to public policy. 2'
Probably the great outstanding step in the process of shifting
loss arising from personal injury has been the enactment of legis-
lation dealing with workmen's compensation. Various statutes
and decisions have accomplished like results in other types of
situations. In particular have railways, both by statute and deci-
sions, been required to bear losses which the "theology of negli-
gence" alone had not placed upon them.22 The same process is
perhaps not so nearly complete in connection with any other en-
terprise, but it has progressed to varying degrees in connection
with some types of physical harms to interests of personality.
Thus, line upon line, precept upon precept, a rule of law comes
into full recognition and a new social policy has won its way.
POUND, FUNCTIONS OF LEGAL PHILOSOPHY, 35 et seq.; CARDozo, THE
NATURE" OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS (1921); CARDOZo, THE GROWTH OF THE
LAW (1924).
"The philosophical habit of the day, the frequency of legislation and
the ease with which the law may be changed to meet the opinions and wishes of
the public, all make it natural and unavoidable that judges as well as others
should discuss the legislative principles upon which their decisions must always
rest in the end, and should base their judgments on broad considerations of pol-
icy, to which the traditions of the bench would hardly have tolerated a reference
fifty years ago." HOLMES, THE COmMON LAW (188i) 78.
' Green, Tte Duty Problem in Negligence Cases, pt. II, (1929) 29 COL. 1.
REV. 256, n.
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CHARITIES
The rule that charities are not liable for the torts of their
servants, at least toward beneficiaries, is still well established;
but, as I have previously tried to show,23 the theories underlying
this rule are wholly illogical. Newer ones, which have been ad-
vanced in recent years to account for certain exceptions which
destroyed the value of the earlier theories, are equally unsatis-
factory. A few decisions have recognized the inherent injustice
of the old doctrine and have imposed liability; some expressly




The question of governmental liability in tort, in its various
aspects, has been minutely examined and discussed by Professor
Borchard in a series of rather recent articles, 25 and the same topic
is the subject of an article by Mr. Barry.26  In cases where the
ordinary rules of tort liability have come into conflict with the
law of municipal corporation, the courts for the most part have
denied recovery for physical injuries to person or property, in-
flicted by the agents or servants of a governmental agency. A
municipal corporation, in such cases, is said by the courts to be
a governmental agency or not a governmental agency, according
to the function in the performance of which the harm was done.
Here is one field in which, according to strict legal tradition,
capacity to bear loss has been permitted to play no part in the
question of whether or not liability should be imposed. Indeed,
not even fault is considered. Once granted that the harm arose
in connection with the performance of a governmental function,
'Feezer, The Tort Liabnlity of Charities (1928) 77 U. OF PA. L. REv. 191.
"'Tucker v. Mobile Infirmary Ass'n, 191 Ala. 572, 68 So. 4 (1915) ; Mul-
liner v. Evangelischer Diakonniessenverein, 144 Mirm. 392, 175 N. W. 699
(9O2); Geiger v. Simpson M. E. Church, 174 Minn. 389, 219 N. W. 463
(1928); Glavin v. Rhode Island Hospital, 12 R. I. 411 (188o) (specifically
overruled by act of legislature); dissent in Bachman v. Y. W. C. A., 179 Wis.
178, igr N. W. 751 (1923).
' Borchard, Govenmtent Liability in Tort (924) 34 YALE L. J. 1, 129, 229;
Borchard, Govenmental Responsibility in Tort (1926) 36 YALE L. J. 1, 757,
1039; Borchard, Govermwntal Responsibility in Tort (1928) 28 CoL. L. REV.
577, 734.
'Barry, Thw King Can Do No Wrong (1924) 1I VA. L. REV. 349.
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the courts have declared that there could be no recovery. It has
made no difference, of course, that the negligence of the servant
of the municipality occurred strictly within the scope and course
of the master's affairs. Nor has it made any difference that
negligence was admitted. The presence or absence of fault on
the plaintiff's part has been entirely immaterial. Indeed, prob-
ably the majority of cases in which this point has been decided
have been determined upon demurrer to the plaintiff's declaration.
The doctrine of governmental immunity from liability for
tort has become firmly intrenched in precedent, and it will only
with difficulty be overthrown. However, so monstrous has it
become in this age,27 that, notwithstanding the continuance of
certain factors of the judicial process in its favor, it has failed
to stem the tide of changing moral and ethical concepts which
has turned so strongly in the opposite direction. The result is
that many cases have been decided in recent years in which
municipalities have been held liable for injuries to property and
person, which could very reasonably have been brought within the
usual reasons for immunity. In short, the moral and justice fac-
tors are preponderating over the administrative factor in the ap-
plication of the judicial process to these cases; so that the injured
citizen who has been run over by a negligent and financially ir-
responsible municipal servant, instead of being thrown out of
court on the ground that the city garbage hauler is exercising the
royal prerogative and performing a governmental function, is
occasionally permitted to tell his troubles to a jury of his fel-
lows. 28  As a recent writer has said:
' Borchard, 28 CoL L. Rv. 734, concludes on page 775 with this sentence:
"Whether that responsibility is justified upon grounds of private law or public
law seems immaterial. The important point is, that in the light of the far
greater advances in theory and practice evident in Europe, we at least might be
prepared to take the mild step of instituting government responsibility in tort."
' POUND, op. cit. suprc note 2 at 185: "Indeed fundamental changes have
been taking place in our legal system almost unnoticed, and a shifting was in
progress in our case law from the individualist justice of the 19Ith century . . .
to the social justice of today. . . . Eight noteworthy changes in the law in
the present generation, which are in the spirit of recent ethics, recent philosophy
and recent political thought, will, serve to make the point . . . Seventh, we
may note an increasing tendency to hold: that public funds should respond for
injuries to individuals by public agencies; that the risk of injuries to individuals
inherent in the operations of government are not to be borne exclusively by the
luckless individual on whom loss happens to fall."
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"The result is that it is impossible to formulate any
general rules as to what will, and what will not, impose lia-
bility on a municipal corporation".
29
There are hundreds-probably thousands-of cases which
deny the liability of a governmental agency for the negligent acts
or omissions of its employees. Such was the almost universal
rule until the last few decades, and even today there are many
cases reported each year from courts of last resort in which the
orthodox result is still reached. These cases rest their result on
the usual theory that the city, county, etc., was exercising a gov-
ernmental function, and hence, as the Connecticut court said,
"enjoyed governmental immunity from liability for the act of
alleged negligence." 30 The use of the word "enjoyed" in this
connection is doubtless intended to be taken in its more colorless
sense, but one can easily shudder at the thought of that imper-
sonal ogre, the state, or the municipal corporation, in its enjoy-
ment at the sight of the babies drowned in the swimming pools
of Kansas 31 and Connecticut, 2 or blown up with dynamite caps
in the municipal stone quarry of Kentucky.3 3  But, instead of
looking at the many cases which uphold governmental immunity
from responsibility, it is proposed to look at some of the recent
cases, comprising a growing list, in which the courts are finding
the way to rationalize decisions in favor of persons injured by
governmental enterprises of one sort or another.
Defective highways are the source of a great deal of litiga-
tion in which governmental agencies, municipal corporations and
quasi-corporations are sued for physical injuries to person or
property.3 4 There is surely nothing less governmental about the
Note (1927) 4 Wis. L. REv. 244.
m Harmon v. The City of Waterbury, io6 Conn. 13, 136 Ati. 876 (1926).
'Warren v. The City of Topeka, v25 Kan. 524, 265 Pac. 78 (1928).
Hannon v. The City of Waterbury, supra note 30.
'White v. The City of Hopkinsville, 2= Ky. 664, I S. W. io68 (1928).
" The word "municipalities" is used herein as referring to both incorporated
and unincorporated local governmental units, of general or special powers. It is
recognized that the pervailing rule makes a municipality which has been incor-
porated liable in tort for defective highways and for torts arising out of its
activities which are said to be "non-governmental", or "corporate", or "business"
functions. Counties and other quasi-corporations, on the other hand, are, by the
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function of maintaining streets, roads, bridges, and the like, than
in carrying on hospitals, schools, parks, playgrounds, street clean-
ing, garbage removal, and many other activities in which cities
are nowadays commonly engaged. Yet as to injuries arising
from defective ways, legal responsibility is generally recognized.
In some jurisdictions there is common law liability in this respect,
and, where this is not so, it is rather generally imposed by
statute. 3
Various theories have been announced as explaining this
special rule as to defects in highways, 36 none of which can be very
satisfactorily reconciled, in point of legal theory, with the general
rule of nonliability. In the article by Professor Borchard, 7 this
feature of the problem of municipal tort liability is discussed and
many cases collected. It seems worth noticing that in the early
history of municipal corporation law most of the tort actions
against municipalities had to do with defective ways, for the
simple reason that the municipalities of that time did not engage
in the majority of the functions now regularly undertaken. The
city of earlier times did not maintain fire departments or hospitals.
Street cleaning, garbage disposal, and ash removing was done
at the expense of individuals or not at all. The opportunities for
a city's employees to come in contact with the inhabitants, under
circumstances involving the possibility of harm, were few. The
simplicity of community life was such that seldom was a citizen
injured by the instrumentalities operated by the city. The rela-
tion of the citizen to his local government was close. He was in
very truth a part of it. His friends and neighbors were both its
governors and its servants. Its revenues were small, and it had
no money with which to pay judgments in case they might be
recovered against it.
This social need for the rule of nonliability no longer exists.
The cities are on a firm basis and are charged with tremendous
rule prevailing in most jurisdictions, exempt from all tort liability except as
provided by statute. 6 McQuILLIN, MuNIcrPAL CoRpoRATIoNs (2d ed. 1928)
§§ 2775, 2900.
'Borchard, Governmental Liability for Tort (925), 34 YAE L. J. 229,
25o n. for collected cases. See 7 MCQUILUN, op. cit. spra note 34, § 29oo.
Shigley v. Waseca, io6 Minn. 94, 1i8 N. W. 259 (igo8).
-Sitpra note 25.
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powers; and they are engaged in many activities which constitute
a menace to the rights of the individual, and under certain cir-
cumstances deprive him of his safety of person and property.3"
Under more primitive conditions the traditional sovereign im-
munity did not so often nor so severely outrage justice, and so
it was not noticeably repugnant to social conscience.
Probably the social morality of the day approved the state-
ment of Ashhurst, J., in Russell v. Men of Devon, in 1788, in
holding a county not liable for injuries resulting from a defective
bridge, when he said: ". . . it is better that an individual
should sustain an injury than that the public should suffer incon-
venience." 39 So when Russell v. Men of Devon was decided,
and for a century thereafter, there were factors entering into
the decision of tort actions against municipalities which, under
the philosophy of the day, naturally enough preponderated over
the interest of the injured plaintiff. The factor of administrative
difficulty was doubtless enough to settle Russell v. Men of Devon.
At that time there was the economic difficulty of giving judgments
against public corporations unable to pay them, and this con-
tinued until their powers in relation to finances had been worked
out more fully. Finally, the whole concept of social responsibility
to the individual handicapped by injury was undeveloped. This
concept had no place in the individualistic philosophy of the
Georgian and Victorian periods of English law.
The modern state has assumed the responsibility of alleviat-
ing the misfortunes of the handicapped. It cares for the sick;
it seeks to prevent disease; it grants mothers' pensions; and it
provides special occupational training for the handicapped citizen,
whether he be blind, deaf, or dumb. It even supplies entertain-
ment and recreation. It does all these things for its people who
are under par and unfit for the economic struggle, without ask-
ing, "Did this man sin, or did his father before him ?" Yet such
I Note (1920) 7 VA. L. REv. 383, 389.
16 East. 305 (Eng. 1788). The remark from the opinion of Ashhurt, J.,
must, however, be regarded as dictum, since the opinion points out that the men
of Devon were not a corporation and hence could not be sued as such; further,
that they had no corporate or common funds which could be used to pay a judg-
ment in such a case.
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is the conservatism of the law that it will not compensate the
citizen who is injured and maimed for life by the negligence of
its servants. Not only does the city refuse to compensate the
victims of its negligence, but it maintains a staff of legal repre-
sentatives equipped to resist the efforts of its citizens to collect
compensation through the courts.
Since it is generally settled that municipal corporations are
liable for injury due to defective highways, that type of case will
not be considered in detail at present, although it mnay be inter-
esting to examine cases dealing with injuries in connection with
sidewalks or other premises, as to which the abutting owner, as
well as the city, may be sued, in order to determine whether there
is any greater tendency to impose liability in case the city is the
defendant, than when the private owner is sued. Another inter-
esting question arises when a defective highway combines with
an instrumentality performing a traditionally governmental func-
tion, to produce a personal injury.
In Cone v. Detroit40 the plaintiff's decedent was killed by
the overturning of a fire truck which struck a hole in the pave-
ment. The deceased was standing in a recessed store entrance
at the time. The issues of fact were found in favor of the plain-
tiff and judgment was given in her favor. The defendant city,
on appeal, raised the point that the accident was really a conse-
quence of the performance of the governmental function of fire
prevention. The court dismissed this contention briefly, simply
pointing out that the plaintiff had based her case, not upon any
negligence in the operation of the fire truck, but solely upon the
question of negligence in the manner of keeping the street.
The interesting thing about this case is that the court, had
it been of the opinion that the plaintiff should not recover, had
at least three chances so to decree. It might have held that this
was not a foreseeable consequence of the defective pavement;
that is, that the hole in the pavement was too remote a cause, and
to 191 Mich. 198, 157 N. W. 417 (1916). The liability for injuries due to
defective streets was based upon a statute which extended the duty of maintain-
ing safe streets to persons on the highway. It is pointed out by the court that
the plaintiff was in the doorway of a store and not really on the street, but as
that point had not -been raised in the record the court refused to consider it.
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that the operation of the fire truck was an intervening independent
cause, and, as this was governmental, the plaintiff could not re-
cover. Or, it might have pointed out that under the statute the
duty which the city owed to travellers, in regard to the safe
maintenance of the street, was limited to persons on the street;
and hence that, even though the hole in the pavement was the
proximate cause of the injury, the deceased, standing where he
was, did not come within the duty imposed by the statute. But
the court held that the statute clearly protected the interest violated
here, and imposed a duty on the city to keep the streets in such
condition as to protect travellers from the hazard of having fire
trucks upset upon them. It treated the recessed entrance to a
store as a part of the highway, so as to bring the personal safety
of persons standing there within the protection afforded by the
statute, as against the hazard of vehicles overturning due to a
defect in the street.
The duty of the city being of such a nature, and the jury
having found the causal connection in that the evidence showed
the hole to be deep enough to throw the fire truck, the plain-
tiff's case is made out. Hence it is immaterial that the vehicle
happened to be a fire truck rather than a privately owned busi-
ness truck, and the city is made responsible, not for its truck,
but for its street.
41
It is almost universally said that a quasi-corporation, such
as a county, is entirely immune from tort liability except as
affected by statutes. In spite of this rule an occasional decision
imposes liability.
In Young v. Juneau County 42 the plaintiff alleged that his
building had been destroyed by fire started by sparks from a steam
' That a city is liable to a fireman thrown from a fire truck by reason of a
hole in the street, see Coots v. City of Detroit, 75 Mich. 628, 43 N. W. 17 (I889),
wherein it was held that the statutory duty to keep streets in a safe condition
extends to firemen. Also that plaintiff as an employee of the city fire depart-
ment did not assume the risk of defective streets.
Similarly as to a volunteer fireman, see City of Austin v. Schlagel, 257 S. W.
238 (Texas 1924). In finding this duty owed to a volunteer who jumped on the
wagon the court said he was an invitee. There was a dictum that the city would
not be liable where an injury was due to the neglience of the driver of the fire
wagon.
192 Wis. 646, 212 N. IV. 295 (1927). See Note (1927) 4 Wis. L. REv.
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shovel belonging to the defendant county and used in taking
gravel from a pit owned by the county and adjoining the plain-
tiff's property. The plaintiff also alleged that the defendant was
negligent in using a defective boiler not properly equipped. The
county, relying on the rule of governmental immunity, demurred.
This was overruled in the trial court, and the order was affirmed
by the Wisconsin Supreme Court. The opinion quotes from
Professor Borchard's article,43 and by inference indicates a dis-
position to be dissatisfied with the orthodox rule of nonliability.
However, without openly repudiating the orthodox rule, the court
finds a way to rationalize a decision consonant with its sense
of justice under the circumstances. It says, quoting from a prior
decision : 44
"The decisions of this court fully sustain the principle
that, while a municipality is not held liable for damages re-
sulting from mere performance of governmental functions,
such exception applies only when the city's relation to the
injured person is governmental, such as a traveler on the
highway, but not when the relation to the injured one is that
of a proprietor."
The court also says:
"It is not necessary to hold that the defendant main-
tained a nuisance. If as an adjoining proprietor it violated
a legal duty owing by it to the plaintiff, liability follows just
as in the case of Bunker v. Hudson".
4
The court points out that the case is decided differently than
it would have been upon the precedents in most other jurisdic-
tions, and shows its hand when it says:
' Borchard, op. cit. spra note 35, at 2.
Matson v. Dane Co., 172 Wis. 52z, I79 N. W. 774 (192o). The court, by
its language here quoted, would seem to have abandoned or overlooked for the
moment the distinction between a true municipal corporation and a county, since
it uses a reference to one as authority for applying the same rule to the other.
12 Wis. 43, 99 N. W. 448 (I9o4), was an action against a city for piling
earth in building a grade so that the earth used in the filling extended upon the
plaintiff's property. It is well settled that an appropriation of the property of
another by either a municipal corporation or a quasi corporation, or even by the
state itself, is not governed by the rules applying to torts generally, but is treated
as a "taking"* of private property for public use without compensation. See 43
C. J. 1126 et seq.; 6 McQUILLIN, supra note 34, at §§ 2871-2886.
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"We see no reason in justice or morals why a group
should not be liable to one to whom its agents have done
injury when a member of the group would be liable if he
had done the same injury to another member of the group.
Multiplication of the number of those who are responsible
for a wrong ought not to establish immunity. . . . The
trend of statute and decision seems to be in the right direc-
tion".46
The whole tone of Judge Rosenberry's opinion, the citation
of actions involving cities as authority in a case against a county,
the ignoring of the usual distinction, the references to Professor
Borchard's articles, indeed, some of the specific language em-
ployed, all point to the outraged sense of justice which impelled
the court to this result. The group referred to by the court, has,
by its servant, caused the loss; the group surely can best bear
that loss.
It would be hard to find another recent case dealing with the
tort liability of a city which has enjoyed more notoriety than
Fowler v. Cleveland,47 decided in Ohio in I919, in which the city
was held liable for injuring a person who was run down by a
negligently driven fire engine returning from a fire. As pointed
out by Jones, J., in the dissenting opinion, this result was con-
trary to almost all of the previous decisions in this country. That
the operation of a fire engine is a governmental function has
always been given as the reason for denying recovery in such
cases. 48  There were, however, a few decisions showing a ten-
dency to break away from this rule. One of these was Opocensky
"' In the Juneau Co. case the court refers to the Michigan case of Alberts v.
Muskegon, 146 Mich. 210, io9 N. W. 262 (igo6), in which it was held that city
was not liable for burning the property of an abutting owner by sparks from a
roller with which its employees were repairing a street. In that case recovery
was denied because of the governmental immunity theory. The Wisconsin court
refers to the Michigan case as representing the "opposite" doctrine, and, in
speculating as to its own doctrine, says: "We recognize that the rule as estab-
lished in this state, if pushed to the extreme limits might produce curious re-
sults. Suppose, by the explosion of a road roller operating upon the streets be-
cause of negligent management of it by the municipality's servants, a traveller's
load of hay is set on fire and an adjoining proprietor's building is ignited. Ap-
parently in one case there would be liability and not in the other because of the
difference in the relationship of the two injured parties to the municipalitv."
7 ioo Ohio St. i58, 126 N. E. 72 (i919), 9 A. L. R. I3 (920).
"'See Note (I92O) 9 A. L. R. 143, and especially Frederick v. Columbus, 58
Ohio St. 538, 51 N. E. 35 (1898), expressly overruled by the Fowler case.
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v. South Omaha, decided in 1917.49 In this case an automobile
belonging to the fire department, while being driven by a city
employee on city business, ran into another car and injured the
plaintiff. The court overruled the city's demurrer, and, without
discussing specifically the rule of governmental nonliability, said
that the city automobile, not being on emergency business, violated
an ordinance by exceeding twelve miles per hour. This reasoning
might have been sufficient to justify recovery against the employee
who was driving, but the opinion ignores the doctrine of municipal
nonliability. In Lafayette v. Allen 50 the city was held liable to
an employee of the fire department who was injured by the ex-
plosion of a defective fire engine while it was being used to pump
water into a city-owned cistern. This decision does not refer
to a city's traditional immunity, and, from what appears in the
report, it is impossible to learn whether it was raised in the record.
In Walters v. The City of Carthage 51 the city was held liable to
the plaintiff who was injured by a defective fire house door which
fell upon him as he was passing on the sidewalk.
In the last mentioned case and in Fowler v. Cleveland the
court said that running a fire department was a ministerial func-
tion and not within the saving rule. The Fowler decision was
rested upon the ministerial function theory, but, throughout the
majority opinion, Justice Johnson shows that he is lead to over-
rule an explicit local authority,5 2 because he has been moved by
considerations of justice as between the parties in the particular
case. Justice Wannamaker, concurring, went farther and pro-
posed abolishing the theory of municipal nonliability, even in
cases of nonfeasance. He relied on arguments referring to the
Ohio constitution, the Declaration of Independence, and even
Biblical teachings as set forth in the New Testament. Justice
Jones, dissenting, on the other hand, after appealing to the same
provisions of the Ohio constitution, indicated that he is for doing
justice, according to the ideas of his predecessors as to what con-
49IoI Neb. 336, 163 N. W. 325 (1917).
'81 Ind. 166 (MI8).
'36 S. D. II, 153 N. W. 881 (19,5).
Frederick v. Columbus, tpra note 48.
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stitutes justice. Justice Johnson notes that in the particular case
the fire apparatus was returning from its call. Justice Jones, in
so far as he considers policy in support of his view, treats the
entire operation of fire departments as a function involving the
need for haste in the interest of public safety.
It may be noted that in none of the three cases last mentioned
was the apparatus on its way to a fire, or engaged in extinguishing
a fire, when the injury occurred. There are several other cases
which hold the city liable for injuries due to fire department
buildings, employees, or apparatus, where not incidental to direct
performance of their fire-extinguishing service.
3
Referring to the fact that the engine was returning from its
fire call in the Fowler case, the opinion says, in connection with
the majority rule in such cases:
"It would seem to be clearly a case in which the reason
of the rule having failed the rule itself should be set aside as
to such injuries." 54
The Ohio court, when the Fowler case was decided, on July
8, 1919, included Nichols, C. J., and Jones, Matthias, Johnson,
Donohue, Wanamaker, and Robinson, JJ. All the members of
the court except Justice Jones concurred in the result, Justice
Wanamaker giving his own opinion, as has been referred to. On
December 29, 1922, the Fowler case was overruled in Aldrich v.
Youngstown," in which Justice Jones wrote the opinion, which
was concurred in by Justices Robinson and Matthias, who were
with the majority in the Fowler case, and by Chief Justice Mar-
shall and Justices Clark and Hough, who had come upon the
court in the meantime. Justice Wanamaker dissented, upholding
the results of the Fowler decision and reiterating his former posi-
tion, again invoking the constitution and advising his colleagues
to look to their oaths as judges. He italicized the references
therein to the duty to "administer justice . . . according to
the best of his ability and understanding", and then calls par-
ticular attention to the italics, concluding with this statement:
5' See Note (192o) 9 A. L. R. 143, 156.
r Supra note 47, at 165.
i o6 Ohio St. 342, 14o N. E. 164 (1922) ; Note (1923) 27 A. L. R. 493.
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"The soundness of a decision must be judged by the
degree in which it is rooted in reason and righteousness. A
judgment that does not contribute to justice is fatally at
fault."
The opinion of the court expressly repudiates the Fowler case,
and affirms what had been the rule prior to i9i9,"e that the opera-
tion of a police power department, like a fire department, is a
municipal function. In its syllabus the court says:
"A municipal corporation is not, in the absence of a
statutory provision, liable in damages to one injured for the
negligent acts of its police department, or any of its mem-
bers."
Although the point was not referred to in Aldrich v. Youngs-
town, the police patrol was answering a call when it injured the
plaintiff. The fire engine was returning when it hit the plaintiff,
Fowler, in the other case.
57
The story of the conflict between the old and the new, be-
tween judgment by adherence to ritualistic formula and precedent,
on the one hand, and by the exercise of the power of judging by
a broad and acknowledged consideration of the social factors
behind legal doctrines, on the other, has not been told in its rela-
tion to negligent fire engines, without some mention of the Florida
cases. In Kaufman v. Tallahasseef in 1922, the plaintiff was
knocked down by the trailer of a fire department truck. Without
having before it any allegation as to whether the truck was an-
Frederick v. Columbus, supra note 48, overruled by Fowler v. Cleveland,
supra note 47.
'Note (192o) CoL. L. REv. 772, 775: "Would not the desired result be at-
tained if the liability of a municipality for torts were the same as that of a private
corporation with one exception-where an outstanding policy . . . demands
the excemption of the city. Under such a rule a fire engine might be driven to
a fire with such speed as to amount to recklessness without imposing on the city
a liability for resulting injuries. Yet it would by no means follow that one in-
jured by the same engine returzmdng from the same fire would be without a rem-
edy. As the law stands today, the city would be deemed to be exercising a gov-
ernmental function in both cases, although no policy operates to exempt it from
liability in the latter case. To apply the same rule to both cases simply because
both injuries resulted from the acts of the same city department seems to be a
most unreasonable conclusion."
184 Fla. 634, 94 So. 697 (1922), 30 A. L. R. 471 (1924) (pedestrian struck
by fire chief's automobile). It does not appear whether it was going to or from
the fire.
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swering a fire call or not, the court reversed an order of the trial
court sustaining a demurrer. Along with its comment upon the
"duty which the city owes to the people", and some reflection upon
the changing and expanding purposes and undertakings of city
governments, the court, casting about for a good orthodox legal
reason for holding the city responsible, and thus not only vindi-
cating outraged justice, but preserving its traditional conservatism,
happily hits upon the point that the defendant has the commission
form of administration and hence is not really a city in the sense
of government, but only in the nature of a co6perative business
enterprise. The question came up in Florida again two years
later. The defendant, the city of Tallahassee, encouraged by the
fact that in its opinion the court. had cited Fowler v. Cleveland,
and noting that the Ohio court had changed its mind, brought
up a second appeal,59 together with a similar situation from
Miami; and in both cases the defendant city was held liable. In
Maxwell v. Miami 60 the court said:
"Whether the operation of a fire department by the city
may be technically denominated a corporate or a governmental
function, the rule in this state is that a municipality is liable
• . . for injuries caused by negligent operations or con-
ditions upon the streets that amount to a nuisance.
The operation upon the public streets of an automobile as
a part of the fire extinguishing equipment of a city, is not
such an essentially or exclusively governmental function as
to exempt the city from liability for injuries to persons law-
fully using the streets, when such injuries are solely caused
by the grossly negligent manner in which the auto is
driven. . , 61
'87 Fla. 119, 100 So. 15o (1924). In this second appeal the court said
nothing about a commission form of government, but quoted as set forth above,
from the Miami case, and in both cases referred to the manner in which fire
equipment was alleged to be driven habitually in Miami and Tallahassee as a
"nuisance', which it was the duty of the city to prevent and for the consequences
of which it was responsible. The court referred to the Aldrich case in Ohio
and indicated that it was not interested in what might be the rule in Ohio or
any other jurisdiction.
0087 Fla. 1O7, 100 So. 147, 33 A. L. R. 682 (1924). One of several cases all
arising out of the same accident and heard together with the same result in each.
The opinion as to police department cars is similar to that in respect to
fire department vehicles. Aldrich v. Youngstown, already referred to, says they
pertain to a governmental function, and hence no responsibility. To the same
effect in Hanson v. City of Fargo, 54 N. D. 487, 2o9 N. W. lOO2 (1926), 47
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The great weight of authority treats the activities which
have been under discussion as governmental and, for the most
part, denies municipal responsibility for injuries arising in their
operation. However, as has been indicated, a considerable num-
ber of cases have refused to apply the rule, and may be observed
that these are recent cases. A somewhat recent annotation on
the subject states: "Different theories are invoked according to
the circumstances, to justify the result in particular cases; but
there seems to be implied in the cases a dissatisfaction with the
results of the application of the general criterion in cases involv-
ing the negligent operation of automobiles, due, perhaps, to the
feeling that the conduct of the city employees in that regard does
not partake distinctively of the governmental functions of the
particular municipal department to which they belong." 62
This is all very true so far as it goes, but why do the courts
invoke different theories? Why are they dissatisfied with the
results of applying the old rule? Is it not because, in the law as
in everything else, new days bring new duties? Here, as in all
negligence cases, the court has before it the duty problem first
of all. Is the plaintiff protected in the interest here violated, as
against the particular hazard? Is the individual, pedestrian, or
driver protected by any rule of law against the hazard of fire
trucks, police patrols, and the like, in view of the manner in which
they are driven and in the usual instance must be driven? What
are the interests involved? On the one hand there is the interest
A. L. R. 816 (i27). On the other hand, it was held in Jones v. Sioux City, 185
Iowa 1178, 17o N. W. 445 (I919), not to be a governmental function to use city-
owned automobiles to carry police patrolmen from the police station to their
beats, and the city was held liable; also in Oklahoma City v. Foster, 118 Okla.
129, 247 Pac. 3I (1926), 47 A. L. R. 822 (1927), to a detective injured while
riding in the side car of a city motorcycle negligently sent out of the city garage
with defective brakes, on the ground that the city's chief of police was not exer-
cising a governmental function in superintending the city garage. Also in New
York, in Kelly v. City of Niagara Falls, 131 Misc. 934, 229 N. Y. Supp. 328
(1928), the city was held liable for negligent injury of plaintiff by a city car
driven by a policeman on duty.
A note in (1928) 28 Co. L. REv. iiii, after commenting on the usual
strictness of New York courts in construing legislation which suggests having
the effect of extending municipal tort liability, says: "The instant case may
perhaps best be explained as a judicial recognition of the better policy of com-
pelling tax-payers to share the burden of inevitable motor accidents rather
than having the person who is injured due to no fault of his own, bear the entire
loss."
2Note (1927) 47A. L. R. 829.
CAPACITY TO BEAR LOSS IN TORT CASES
in the safety of pedestrians and all users of the public ways-for
whose use they exist. On the other hand there is the interest in
public safety to be subserved by a rule of law which justifies, for
the operation of police or fire fighting equipment, a manner of
using the streets which is perhaps never safe and not ordinarily
necessary. There is the public interest in the prevention of fire,
tending to justify speed. There is the.interest in preventing acci-
dents enroute to the fire, operating to justify caution. This con-
flict of interests has been repeatedly recognized and is referred to
as a public policy. The tendency of the cases to be more liberal
with the injured plaintiff and less open to arguments of precedent,
when the fire engine or the patrol wagon is returning from a call,
is a response to a natural distinction. It is a judicial reaction to
the factor of justice and prevention of harm. There have been
references in some of the cases to the economic factor of an un-
desirable financial burden likely to be imposed upon the state or
municipality, but it seems evident that this is not prominent and
has not been discoverable in any of the more recent cases. The
disposition of the courts is to hold municipal corporations liable
upon the same terms as private corporations for the operation of
their vehicles and machinery. When recovery is not allowed, the
reason universally given is not referred to any of the other factors,
but always to the precedent difficulty. The Ohio court, so far,
as has been noticed in the recent cases, is the only one which has
turned back; and, as has been pointed out, in the earlier Fowler
case the car was returning from its emergency call, and in the
later case, in which recovery was denied, it was answering the
emergency. This may be why the two judges who concurred in
both cases were able to do so. It is difficult to see how they could
have concurred with the reasoning in both cases.
In surveying the cases which seem to show a tendency to
extend the tort liability of the various governmental agencies, it
will be found that the operation of various vehicles is only one
of many types of city, county, and government activity which is
producing a volume of litigation. In connection with many city
undertakings will be found cases evdencing the dissatisfaction
with the old rule of municipal immunity.
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STREET CLEANING AND WASTE REMOVAL
The municipal collection of ashes and garbage, the sprinkling
and cleaning of streets, and many other operations carried on by
the city and involving the use of the streets and the operation of
city owned vehicles over the streets, all have produced their quota
of litigation. They have been held to be governmental functions
and recovery has been denied in a great list of cases; they have
been held to be ministerial functions in other cases and recovery
has been allowed for injuries arising in connection with their
performance. Sometimes the cases allowing recovery call the
function municipal, as distinguished from governmental; some-
times it is called corporate; sometimes it is found to constitute a
nuisance.
RECREATIONAL FACILITIES
As to parks and playgrounds, the recreational facilities
afforded by cities, there seems to be less disposition upon the part
of courts to hold that the city is performing a governmental
activity and is hence immune from tort liability. The cases which
do apply the immunity rule are not of particular interest in con-
nection with the present inquiry unless it be from a quantitative
standpoint. These seem to agree in their argument that the main-
tenance of parks and playgrounds is a governmental function.
They frequently endeavor in such opinions to lay down a test
for determining what is governmental. Whether this is because
the judges are touched by a feeling that it is unfortunate for the
plaintiff and hence they must justify their position, or whether
they wish to lay down a criterion for their successors, is difficult
to determine. 63 At any rate, if a court decides to deny recovery
Hannon v. The City of Waterbury, supra note 30; and Note (1928) 57
A. L. R. 402, is an example of a labored effort to lay down a rule for deter-
mining what is, and what is not, a governmental function. Warren v. City
of Topeka, supra note 31, Note (1928) 57 A. L. R. 555, on the other hand,
is a case in which the city was held not liable for the death of children,
patrons of a municipal swimming pool, who were permitted to enter the
pool and were drowned at a time when no life guard was on duty. In
this case the court attempted no rationalization of this result, but merely
referred to previous cases and said such was the law, without inquiring into
such considerations as justice, social policy, or even the so-called "principles"
of the law. In this case recovery was denied even as against the concessionaire
who was operating the pool under lease from the city as well as against the
corporation. Here is a strong illustration of a case where the preponderant
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to a person injured on public recreational premises, where the
action is based on negligence, a basis of rationalization is at hand
in the time-tried old formulas.
The interesting cases are those in which the courts are un-
willing to rest on this formula. For example, in Burton v. Salt
Lake City 0 4 the Utah Supreme Court reversed the order of a
lower court which had sustained a demurrer to a complaint based
upon the death of plaintiff's decedent through the negligence of
the city, in connection with a city swimming pool and bath house.
The court was faced with its own rather recent decision that fire
departments are owned and operated in a governmental capacity,65
and also parks and playgrounds; 6 but it finally succeeded in per-
suading itself that, since the plaintiff alleged that the city main-
tained its bath house for profit, and the defendant demurred, there-
fore the city of Salt Lake was not performing a governmental
function. The many cases holding the city exempt from liability
under similar circumstances make no point of the fact that a
charge was made, and even point out expressly that the charge,
being merely for maintenance, is entirely immaterial. 7  It will
be interesting to note whether the entering wedge in Utah will
be driven home by future decisions or withdrawn by later con-
servatives, as happened in Ohio.68
In Augustine v. Town of Brant 69 the court, holding the
city liable in connection with a bathing beach, had to surmount
two obstacles. In the first place, it was necessary to determine
whether maintaining a bathing beach was a governmental func-
tion, and, if this were answered in the negative, whether the
maintenance of a park was, for a municipality, an ultra vires act.
It is usually held that a municipality is not liable for tort in con-
nection with ultra vires undertakings. The New York Court of
Appeals disposed of the ultra vires argument by saying that,
factor in judging is the administrative simplicity of following unquestioningly
the prior decisions.
"69 Utah i86, 253 Pac. 443 (926), 5i A. L. R. 364 (927).
' Rollou v. Ogden City, 66 Utah 475, 243 Pac. 79I (1926).
'Alder v. Salt Lake City, 64 Utah 568, 231 Pac. iio2 (1924).
H -annon v. Waterbury, supra note 30.
Fowler v. Cleveland, supra note 47.
249 N. Y. i98, 163 N. E. 732 (1928).
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while the defendant town went beyond its powers in acquiring
and equipping the park lands, nevertheless, as to maintaining
parks, it was not wholly without its powers, because maintaining
parks is within the corporate municipal powers. Having suc-
cessfully passed the objection that the acquisition of the swim-
ming place was ultra vires, Judge Pound was able to rely on
earlier New York decisions holding that a park is not a govern-
mental function in the case of a city and found no difficulty in
extending the theory to a town in the present case. But the real
reason for this decision appears in the concluding paragraph,
where the court said:
"The modern tendency is against the rule of non-liability.
Liability for highway negligence has been imposed by statute
upon towns and counties.
"The establishment of a town park may incidentally
benefit the public health but that fact does not make
a governmental function. A wise public policy forbids us
to -recognize the town of Brant as acting as a sovereign when
it maintains its park. It acts as a legal individual voluntarily
assuming a duty . . . when it assumes such a duty it
also assumes the burdens incident thereto." 70
Here again is a decision furnishing a wedge which may open
the judicial minds of some of the jurisdictions, 71 so that we shall
"Italics are the author's.
'Most of the cases hold that a city is not liable for wrongs committed in
the course of an ultra vires undertaking, see Radford v. Clark, 113 Va. 199, 73
S. E. 571 (1912) (unauthorized operation of quarry; injury due to blasting) ;
Pacey v. North Birmingham, 154 Ala. 511, 45 So. 663 (19o7) (unauthorized
operation of electric light plant).
Even though the function is not governmental as indicated by the case last
cited, the courts seem to have taken this view for the most part. Could any
rule of law be more outrageous to the concept of justice than a holding that
where a city has the legal authority to build and operate an electric plant, but
extends its line beyond the city limits, it is not liable for the injury or death
of a traveller along the highway, where such line is down, due to its negligence.
Yet that is what has been held as late as 1926, in Hyre v. Brown, 1o2 W. Va.
505, 135 S. E. 656 (1926), 49 A. L. R. 123o (1927), and in Woodward v. The
City of Seattle, 140 Wash. 83, 248 Pac. 73 (1926). The City of Seattle, owning
and operating a street railway, as an improvement to this service acquired and
operated motor buses. The plaintiff was injured by the negligence of a driver.
It was held that, as the operation of motor buses was iltra zires, the plaintiff's
action must be dismissed. The court admits the injustice of the result when it
says in conclusion: "While it may be that these views will deprive appellant of
a remedy against any save those who are financially unable to respond, yet the
larger good of a settled rule as to the powers of a municipality must prevail."
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shortly be rid of the unjust, unreasonable, antisocial consequences
of the ultra vires doctrine as applied to negligence cases. Such
decisions can be supported by no other theory than that one wrong
(ultra vires) is a license to commit another wrong without legal
responsibility.
If judicial decisions are to be supported by social sanction,
they must express a vision on the part of the judges which can
see through and beyond the scholastic metaphysics of the law's
technicalities. Such decisions as that of Judge Pound in the New
York case, while not expressing all the factors which contribute
to the process of judgment, nevertheless reveal that the process
of judging is still in the control of the judge, and has not been
entirely surrendered into the dead hands of a precedent or formula
of words. In short, here is a court exercising the high function
of the law-passing judgment. Law cannot be more than an
expression of the sanctions of society to human relations, and
society is not content that it shall be less. Can it be that society
sanctions a principle that a city is not legally responsible, where
its members are killed or injured by its negligent servants, because
those servants had been set to a task which the city had no au-
thority to undertake, or that its members may be killed by the
dangerous machines that the city has wrongfully placed in the
hands of its negligent servants ? 72
It is submitted that Holcomb, J., dissenting, expressed not only better law
but better common sense, when he said: "Had appellant bought a ticket entitling
him to transportation in part over this bus line and been refused carriage or
ejected from the bus or something of that kind, the city probably could right-
fully have interposed the plea of ultra vires under our statute, but where, as
here, appellant was injured by the instrumentality used by respondent in its
traffic system, through negligence, i. e., an act or omission of the municipality,
it seems to me that it is stretching the doctrine of udtra vires to a very great
extent to hold that the municipality is not liable." This distinction between tort
and contract as a basis for a defense of idtra vires is made by Miller, J., in
Salt Lake City v. Hollister, i18 U. S. 256, 6 Sup. Ct. 1O55 (1886).
" In admiralty law the fact that the tort was ulira vires is no defense.
The "Major Reybold,' iii Fed. 414 (E. D. Pa. igol). In Salt Lake City v.
Hollister, supra note 71, there is a dictum to the effect that municipal corpora-
tions should be held liable notwithstanding ultra vdres.
It is well settled that the rule exempting municipal corporations from tort
liability for negligence does not apply in admiralty. Workman v. New York,
179 U. S. 552, 21 Sup. Ct. 212 (19oo) is the leading case. Accord: Thompson
Navigation Co. v. Chicago, 79 Fed. 984 (N. D. Ill. 1897); Texas Co. v. City
of New York, 29o Fed. 382 (C. C. A. 2d, 1923). These were cases involving
fire boats owned by municipal corporations. The Supreme Court, however,
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There are a great many cases dealing with the liability of
the city for injury due to defective park and playground ap-
paratus, a few of which will be referred to. In Warden v.
Grafton 73 the West Virginia court, after considerable discussion
of a number of cases holding opposite views as to whether parks
are a governmental function, permitted recovery by a child in-
jured on a slide in the city park. The court specifically mentions
justice as one of the factors in the case.74 Yet this is the same
court which the next year found ultra vires an insuperable obstacle
to recovery in Hyre v. Brown.7 5 The opinion concludes with a
reference to the "movement, etc." toward a duty of reasonable
care, "which we think is the more wholesome and equitable rule."
The Wyoming court, in one of the most scholarly opinions to be
found on this point,76 finally held the city liable for a defective
playground swing, on the rather unsatisfactory ground that the
injured child was an invitee. It could not call a playground a
governmental activity and hold the city liable, nor was it a business
activity, so the court said that in running a playground the city
was acting as a substitute for a charitable or benevolent body, and
hence'must use as much care as a private charity. 77  Hence this
reached a contrary conclusion where the defendant was the state itself. In re
State of New York, 256 U. S. 490, 41 Sup. Ct. 588 (1921). In Harris v.
Dist. of Columbia, 256 U. S. 65o, 41 Sup. Ct. 61o (I92I), the Supreme Court
said that the Workman case was not to be taken as authority for the repudiation
by the federal courts of the doctrine of municipal immunity as a whole but
was to be strictly confined to admiralty cases.
799 W. Va. 249, 128 S. E. 375 (1925); for numerous cases see Notes
(1926) 42 A. L. R. 263 (1924) 29 A. L. R. 863, (1927) 51 A. L. R. 370, (1928)
57 A. L. R. 406.
' "Then there is the justice of compensating the plaintiff for his injuries",
and, as wast said in Barnes v Dist. of Col., 91 U. S. 540 (1875), commenting
on Bailey v. Mayor of New York, 3 Hill 531 (N. Y. 1842): "The struggle
in the New York case was between the dictates of that evident justice and
good sense which required that the city should indemnify a sufferer for the
loss arising from the acts of those doing a work under its authority and for
its benefit and the technical rule which exempted it from liability for acts of
officers not under its control or appointed by it."
102 W. Va. 505, 135 S. E. 656 (I926), 49 A. L. R. 123o (1927).
7'Ramirez v. Cheyenne, 34 Wyo. 67, 241 Pac. 710 (1925), 42 A. L. R.
245 (1926).
'In Canon City v. Cox, 55 Colo. 264, 133 Pac. 1040 (1913), the "Merry-go-
round" in the city park was installed by a private charitable organization known
as the "Civic Improvement League," with the consent of the city. It had
become defective through wear and the plaintiff was injured. Held, city is
liable.
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case would not be authority for holding a city liable for negligent
acts of misfeasance by its servants, but only for the nonfeasance
of failing to provide a safe places Is it then as easy to fix
liability upon a municipal corporation for nonfeasance as for
misfeasance? In general the city is not made responsible for loss
or injury due to failure to perform a governmental function.
That is to say, even where a municipal corporation is liable for
' Most of the tort actions which have been brought against municipalities
for injuries in connection with schools would appear to involve the condition
of school buildings and equipment. The rule here has been for the most part,
as might be expected, that there is no liability, the result usually being rested
upon.the ground that education is a governmental function. Hill v. Boston, i22
Mass. 344 (1877) is usually regarded as the leading case. In that case it was
held that the city was not liable for injury due to an unsafe stairway in the
school building.
That rule has been applied in recent cases. See Gold v. Baltimore City,
137 Md. 335, 11 AtI. 588 (I92I), in which it was held that the city was not
liable for injury to a child through the fall of a door in a school building,
on the ground that education is a governmental function. The same rule was
applied in Jaked v. Board of Education, 113 Misc. 572, 185 N. Y. Supp. 88
(I920). But in Hermn v. Board of Education, 234 N. Y. I96, 137 N. E. -
(1922), the New York Court of Appeals held the school board liable to a
pupil who was injured by an unguarded buzz-saw in the manual training depart-
ment. The case was distinguished from one relying on respondeat superior, andwas decided on the theory that the board could be held liable for its own cor-
porate act in providing a machine which in its condition was dangerous. This
result was reached ostensibly without surrendering allegiance to the doctrine of
immunity in case of governmental functions. But it certainly cannot be recon-
ciled with the cases, running back to Hill v. Boston, supra note 73, which exemptthe corporation from liability in case of injuries arising out of the condition
of the school building and its equipment. Another buzz-saw case reaches the
opposite result in England, in Smerkinich v. Newport Corp., 76 T. P. 454, 10
L. G. R . 959 (Eng. 1912) ; although in England the general rule seems to be to
hold the corporation liatle for the negligence of either the corporation or its
agents. Ching v. Surrey County Council, [1910] 2 K. B. 736 (where the plain-
tiff caught his foot in a hole in the pavement of the school play ground). See
other English cases cited Note (io) 9 A. L. R. 912 (child's fingers caught
in door) ; Marvis v. Carnarven Co. Council, [1910] 2 K. B. 84o. In the State
of Washington, school districts are made liable by statute. See redfield v.
School Dist., 48 Wash. 85, 92 Pac. 77o (197). But, as to athletic equipment,
see Stovall v. School Dist., IiO Wash. 97, 188 Pac. 12 (192o).
The New York court might be expected to decide for the defendant in anaction based upon injury to a pupil by the negligence of its servants, in view
of the distinction taken in the Herman case. Board of Education v. McHenry,
LO6 Ohio St. 357, 40 N . E. 69 (19o2), held the city not liable to a person
injured by the negligence of the school dentist to whose treatment he was
required by the school authorities to submit. In England, on the other hand,
in Smith v. Martin, [Co11] 2 K. B. 775, the corporation was held liable to a
child who caught fire and was injured while trying to tend a stove at the
teacher's direction. It was held negligence upon the part of the teacher to ask
the plaintiff to tend the fire. In this case Fletcher Moulton, j., does not even
refer to the doctrine of nodiability in the case of a public corporation, but deals
only with the question whether the teacher could be said to be ithin the scope
of her authority in giving the order to the plaintiff.
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its wrongs, that liability is usually based on the negligence in the
manner of doing the act in question or, as in the case just referred
to, negligence in the failure to maintain in a safe condition prem-
ises which it has thrown open to the public. On the other hand,
suppose a citizen is robbed, or his home burns, or he acquires
smallpox from an unquarantined neighbor, or suppose that only an
inadequate or poorly conducted school is available for the edu-
cation of his children. Is the city liable in tort for the loss or injury
suffered by the citizen because he was not afforded perfect pro-
tection by the city in the exercise of its police powers?
Without a detailed presentation of cases on this point it is
sufficient to say that the state and its agencies, under the decisions
in the past, have not been held legally responsible for failure to
supply this type of service.7 9
If we approach the question of responsibility in cases of this
type from the point of view of policy, capacity to bear loss, or
social necessity, it is obvious that we are dealing with a very
different problem from that encountered in cases of negligent
misfeasance by city employees or negligent failure to keep prem-
ises in repair. So generally does it appear to be recognized that
96 MCQUILLIN, op. cit. sitprc note 34, § 2801. In Sanger v. Kansas
City, iii Kan. 262, 2o6 Pac. 89i, 23 A. L. R. 294 (iQ22), it was held
that a city is not liable in damages to one who is robbed on the streets even
though several persons take part in the "hold-up". Liability is imposed by
statute in a great many jurisdictions for injuries due to mobs, and the plaintiff
in the instant case invoked this statute. The lower court gave judgment for
the plaintiff, but this was reversed, one member of the court dissenting. It is
submitted that the case correctly decided that the statute in question did not
protect the interest here involved as against this particular hazard.
The leading case on this question of liability for mob violence is Darlington
v. Mayor of New York, 31 N. Y. 164 (1865). Cases are collected in Notes
(I923) 23 A. L. R. 297 and (i92i) 13 A. L. R. 751-779.
In Maryland there is a group of cases holding municipalities liable for
failure to make and enforce ordinances against various uses of the public streets
which tend to make them dangerous; e. g., in Hagerstown v. Klotz, 93 Md.
437, 49 At. 836 (igoi), the city was held liable for injury due to nonenforce-
ment of an ordinance against bicycle-riding on sidewalks. See also cases col-
lected in 43 C. J. 954, n. 7 (c), and Note (igoo) 47 L. R. A. 294 for cases
contra.
There is also a considerable body of cases dealing with the liability of cities
for injury due to failure to prevent various acts on the public streets, par-
ticularly coasting These decisions appear to be almost evenly divided in number
as to their result. As to all these cases which can be in any way connected
with the duty to maintain safe streets, and which hold the city liable, it is to be
noted that any logic in the rule of nonliability is thrown aside. Cases on coast-
ing are collected in (I97) 46 A. L. R. 1436; Borchard, 34 YALE L. J. 270, n.
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the city is under no legal obligation to furnish protection against
crime, fire, disease, etc., that but few cases have dealt with it.
The administrative difficulty attendant upon the application
of a rule of liability here is obvious. To show that A was robbed
because of the negligence of the city police force, or that B con-
tracted an infectious disease because the city health officer was
negligent, involves the type of litigation in which courts have
been hesitant to give relief, even without the obstacle of the
special rules which favor governmental agencies. It has been
said either that the consequencies are too remote, or that the
damages are too speculative, or some other formula has been
employed; but, whatever the reasons given in particular opinions,
it is plain enough that policy is against recovery in such cases,
and, even though the sociological jurisprudence of the present
day does tend to favor shifting the loss to the community for
direct negligence in the affirmative conduct of municipal servants,
it has not as yet reached the point of insuring against such ever-
present, but elusive, risks as these.
It has been most emphatically asserted that cities, counties,
and like agencies are not liable for injuries arising out of the
conduct of activities relating to the public health. This is so,
even of private charities. There is not only the principle, that
"the king can do no wrong", but also the hesitancy to burden the
good samaritan and discourage charity, which has to be overcome
before recovery can be had against cities in connection with their
health protection agencies. This has been adhered to for the
most part in recent cases.80 Two recent cases, however, have
held a city liable to patients in the city hospital injured by the
negligence of its employees."- The Oklahoma court takes the
position that, in running a hospital at which paying patients are
received, a city is acting in a quasi-private function.
"However, this conception of a city hospital as private
is not generally supported by authority. Also the fact that
the plaintiff in a particular case is a paying patient does not
'Franklin v. Seattle, 112 Wash. 671, 192 lac. IOI5 (192o), 12 A. L. R.
247 (1921) ; see also Note (1927) 49 A. L R. 379, for further cases.
"City of Shawnee v. Rousch, ioi Okla. 6o, 223 Pac. 354 (1924) ; City of
Pawhuska v. Black, 17 Okla. 1O8, 244 Pac. 1114 (1926).
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seem to the present writer as extremely important, inasmuch
as the cases exempting hospitals from liability do not make
a distinction on this ground." 82
These cases are in line with the increasing tendency to hold
municipalities liable in tort even in connection with their govern-
mental functions. A recent writer, commenting on one of the
Oklahoma cases, says s-3:
"The Oklahoma case imposes the responsibility of any
profit making corporation. This, it is submitted, best serves
the welfare of society. The modern tendency, through vari-
ous forms of insurance,- . . . workmen's compensation
acts and the like-is to shift the burden from the innocent
victim to the community." 84
It is impossible to review in one article all the interesting
recent cases which illustrate this risk-shifting policy. They arise
from time to time in connection with all the many functions of
the modern city. There are other aspects of the governmental
agency involved in situations out of which injuries arise which
should be briefly referred to as indicating the disposition of the
courts to extend liability.
When the state itself, rather than a local governmental unit
such as a city or county, is guilty of a tort, can recovery ever be
had? It is, of course, well understood that the state cannot be
sued without its consent. Therefore, one who is injured by the
negligence of a state employee on state business is without legal
remedy unless a statute so provides."5 As a matter of practice
'Feezer, Tort Liability of Charities (1928) 77 U. OF PA. L. REv. 191,
197, n. I0.
Note (1924) 34 YALE L. J. 316.
See also Marx, The Curse of the Persowl Iijury Suit and a Remedy,
supra note 7; see also (1929) 29 CoL. L. REv. 55 (note last paragraph).
INote (1921) 13 A. L. R. 1268, in which the state was held liable under a
consent statute for the death of children, following vaccination with a serum
from the state laboratory, claimed by the plaintiff to have been contaminated.
See in the opinion a discussion of the theory of a state's immunity from suit.
Consent statutes appear to have been strictly construed. See Note (1921) 13
A. L. R. 1268; also cases collected by Prof. Borchard in his articles in 34 and 36
YALE L. J. It has been held in New York that the establishment of a court of
claims does not make the state liable to suit for the torts of its servants.
Smith v. New York State, 2-7 N. Y. 405, 125 N. E. 841 (192o). Accord:
Dietrich v. Palisades Park Commission, 114 Misc. 425, 187 N. Y. Supp. 454
(1921).
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it is customary in such cases to appeal to the legislature for an
appropriation for the compensation of the victim.
There are a great number of cases involving various incor-
porated quasi-state bodies, such as state fairs, whose governing
bodies are boards appointed by the governor or legislature, and
which receive an appropriation from the state. There are deci-
sions both for and against liability among those cases. Inasmuch
as these agricultural societies and the like run as a business,
charging for their services in various ways, it would seem no
stretch of legal principles to hold them liable as private corpora-
tions.8 6
The tort liability of the city in connection with the operation
of a business enterprise, such as a gas plant, light plant, or street
railway, for the negligence of its employees is so completely
settled as to require no comment. What about the case of a busi-
ness owned by the federal or state government? The Shipping
Board has been fruitful of a mass of litigation, 7 and the United
States Government owns and operates many other business en-
terprises, including several railroads. In Panama Railway v.
Curran s it appeared that the plaintiff was injured by slipping
on the floor of a station commissary building upon which an
employee had negligently put oil. The United States owned all
the stock in the corporation except directors' qualifying shares,
and the directors had been required to deposit with the Secretary
of the Treasury irrevocable powers of attorney authorizing the
Secretary to transfer their shares; this being provided for in the
Act of Congress authorizing taking over the road. It was held
that the railway was liable, because the court found that the statute
relating to it showed the intention of Congress to preserve its
corporate entity.89
I Borchard, 34 YALE L. J. i, 25, n.
Ibid., 22 et seq.
"256 Fed. 768 (C. C. A. 5th, IM1g).
' Tort liability in such cases seems to depend chiefly upon construction of
the statute involved, and a contrary result was reached in Ballaine v. Alaska
Northern Ry., 259 Fed. 183 (C. C. A. 9th, i9ig), 8 A. L. R. 995 (192o).
As to state-owned railways, see Western & Atlantic Ry. v. Carlton, 28 Ga.
iSo (1858). The state owned a railway and had passed a statute providing that
claims not settled otherwise could be the basis of a suit against the manager.
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A study of other types of tort cases than those dealing with
municipal corporations may yield a richer find of material indi-
cating that the courts are influenced by capacity to bear loss in
determining legal duty. In the municipal corporation cases all
the usual obstacles tending to restrict recovery to situations com-
ing within the various doctrines of the law of negligence must
be surmounted, even if the courts overrule the city's demurrer,
which will be supported by the argument for its traditional im-
munity as government. If we search the cases involving injuries
through negligence in conducting electric light plants we shall
find numerous cases in which the "theology of negligence" will
furnish the interesting features of the case, and since such un-
dertakings are business functions it will be immaterial whether
the electric plant is municipally or privately owned. It is proposed
to consider these types of cases in a later article continuing the
discussion here introduced. It is only when the negligence issue
is settled, when an individual or a private corporation would be
held legally responsible for the injury, that the governmental
immunity becomes the real issue. Of course if the city can suc-
cessfully demur on the ground of its governmental immunity,
the negligence issue need not be considered.
If the courts are willing to go the extreme length of disre-
garding so strongly intrenched a doctrine as the one founded on
the expression "the king can do no wrong", we may well expect
to find them working out the duties necessary to hold defendants
liable in connection with the greatly increased hazards which our
mechanical civilization has created.
While the old rule is still applied in the majority of the
cases, the significant thing is that there are cases which are find-
ing ways around it, or repudiating it, in order to do the manifest
justice which the case demands, and furthermore these cases are
recent. Moreover, when the rule was departed from in the last
century, the departure was always rationalized and due homage
paid to the old rule. If the plaintiff was relieved, it was by the
In this case the court said that when a state goes into business it assumes
business liabilities, and held the state liable in a tort action for personal injury
which was brought against the manager under the statute. Similar interpre-
tation of a similar statute is found in Arnstein v. Gardner, 134 Mass. 4 (198z).
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"case knife" method, in name at least, if not in fact.90 More
and more cases are frankly admitting that it is time to discard
the "case knife" entirely both in word and action; for, as has
been said by the United States Circuit Court, through Justice
Learned Hand:
"The profession of the law . . . is charged with
the articulation . . . of the successive efforts towards
justice; it must feel the circulation of the communal blood
or it will wither and drop off. . ,, 91
'Supra note io.
Hand, The Speech of Justice (915) 2 HAuv. L. REv. 617.
